Informed Speculation

With the execution of Saddam Hussein over, and with the reaction limited to protest marches thus far (as detailed in an AP story that puts the death by violence in Iraq last year at between 14,000 and 16,300, less than a tenth of the ’unassailable’ Lancet annual toll), what happens in Iraq now?

It appears to this observer that the coalition against Sadr is losing momentum, as the Shiites once again rally around the government and pull together.  However, perhaps looks are deceiving:

U.S.-led forces are likely to launch a limited New Year offensive against Shi’ite cleric Moqtada al-Sadr’s Mehdi Army militia, blamed for sectarian death squad killings, senior Iraqi officials say.

The Pentagon, in a report last month, described Mehdi Army militias as the biggest threat to Iraq’s security and diplomats say Washington is impatient to confront them.

Several officials in the Shi’ite political parties that dominate Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki’s unity government also say they are losing patience with Sadr’s supporters and predict more raids like last week’s joint U.S.-Iraqi operation in which a senior Sadr aide was killed.

“There will be limited and targeted operations against members of the Mehdi Army,” a senior Shi’ite official told Reuters. “The ground is full of surprises but we think around Jan. 5 there will be some operations. I can say no more.”

British forces in the southern oil province of Basra have also been conducting major raids against groups they describe as “rogue Mehdi Army”, some entrenched in Iraqi police units.

Last week, British troops blew up the headquarters of Basra’s Major Crimes Unit and said they freed tortured prisoners.

“The Americans want a war with the Mehdi Army,” said a Western diplomat in Baghdad, who is not American or British.

“They want to get rid of the militia and it seems they will succeed in getting one.”

As usual, Iraq the Model is essential in explaining how the new moderate front lost momentum when Sistani declined to back it and instead tried to push Sadrists into a more reasonable stance.  Hope is not entirely lost, however, as Mohammed sees the latest moves as only delaying the inevitable:

The parties afraid from a change did not only warn the Ayatollah about the serious situation but even put in his mouth the “best way” to solve the problem which is convincing the Sadrists to abandon their destructive stance that’s been threatening the unity of the alliance.

Although the Sadrists said they would think about it and that they would rejoin the political process (on conditions) the facts on the ground and the constant irresponsible atrocities committed by their gangs makes it very difficult to trust any words they give.

I think the targeting of Aadil Abdul Mahdi in Karrada, the stronghold of the SCIRI shows the level of Shia infighting. This along with the constant challenging to the authorities, mass kidnappings and the attempts to take over Shia cities in the south; this bloody conflict that reached the doorsteps of the UIA leaders is making the moderates in the UIA less interested in preserving the alliance in its old form.

Others will try everything to keep the alliance united and so will Sistani but they will be facing the realism of the others. Even Sistani himself knows that the change is supported by other senior clerics in Najaf which means his word will be faced by opposition from other Ayatollahs who don’t agree with him and who also endorse members and parties within the same alliance.

Meanwhile Maliki and his party have not chosen their way yet and Maliki is torn between two choices; he and his party would like the situation to remain unchanged and at the same time hope the Sadrists come back to reason, but I think every day that passes is making him more willing to consider joining the moving train rather than missing it. Sadr’s stiffness will fix Maliki on this track.

It will take some time and lots of talks for the new formation to emerge, and overriding Sistani’s interference won’t be an easy task at all because who used his influence to win in the first place can’t just abandon him like that. a strong and good excuse will be needed to get over it.

In any case I can only see a change coming, the present suggests this, not the past. And perhaps the biggest event that I expect to come after the new front is formed would be calling for holding early general elections towards the end of 2007, and then the political map of Iraq will be different.

Patience is again called for, though I worry the public (and the media) are almost out…