Decision ‘08

Checking In With Iraq The Model

Whenever events in Baghdad start to get interesting, I always look to Iraq the Model to see how Mohammed and Omar are reacting. First, here’s Omar on the ISG report:

The External Approach; I basically do not think this can work especially when it comes to dealing with the main regional players; Syria and Iran and particularly Iran. I simply can’t see a chance for the US to find common grounds with the current regime in Iran whose main goal is to extend its “Islamic revolution” throughout the middle east.

And I have no doubt that Iran, with the mullahs in power, is not willing to accept a compromise that offers the US even a marginal level of benefit. The goals and visions of the two countries are so at odds that they can’t agree on anything, let alone work together.

Syria represents a rather different issue but still, what applies to Iran applies to Syria as well; the history of the middle east-one full of blood from coups-taught us not to trust clerics nor dictators.

Both never keep promises and they can come up with pretexts to feel good about their lies; clerics would say they had to do so to serve God and the community and dictators…well, they have no respect for their people in the first place, so why would we expect them to feel ashamed of not keeping promises!

But I digress…

All I want to say is that the political offensive described in the ISG report must evolve into an intensive political assault if it’s to become a valid strategy.

Plus, there’s big discrepancy between the internal and external approaches time-wise. While the internal approach sets deadlines sometimes as short as one month, the external approach is left with loose deadlines and the implementation of its recommendations depends largely on cooperation of states other than Iraq and America; states that are not so interested in helping us in the first place.

What I want to say is; if the external approach is really important to success then it has to go side by side with the internal one, and that I doubt would happen in the way it’s presented in the report.

On the other hand and contrary to the external approach I think the Internal Approach has outlined several very thoughtful and astute recommendations for policy adjustments particularly in areas such as increasing the numbers of embedded US military advisers, the judicial system, fighting corruption, the oil sector (the meters and the way to deal with local tribes for example), putting police commandos and border guards under the defense ministry…These are good ideas that when implemented will make a difference.

So a distinction is made between internal and external recommendations, with the internal favored and the external largely dismissed. While I certainly agree that (a) the external recommendations are not realitic at all, and are dead in the water, and that (b) not ALL of the report’s recommendations are bad ideas, the report’s own authors have cautioned that the report should be seen as an ‘all-or-nothing” proposition:

Seventy-nine recommendations. Interdependent, insists Baker. They should be taken as a whole. “I hope we don’t treat this like a fruit salad and say, ‘I like this but I don’t like that.’

Of course, Baker has no control over whether all, none, or some of the ISG’s recommendations are implemented, but it’s unrealistic in the extreme to assume that all the recommendations will be implemented (the real answer will be some, but not many, I suspect).

Now, here’s Mohammed on the recent political manuevering:

Instead of a ‘national rescue front’ led by the opposition some influential politicians here are considering forming a new political front made up of members of the government ostensibly to override sectarian and ethnic divides, and it seems there’s support from Washington to form this bloc.

More about the shape and role should be clear when Tariq al-Hashimi returns from there as he represents one of the main candidate components of the proposed bloc (the Islamic party, the SCIRI and the two Kurdish parties) with reports about possible inclusion of the Iraqi bloc of Allawi, who already said he’d join the bloc if he gets invited to.

This new bloc, once formed, is expected to work jointly with Maliki to carry out a wide cabinet reshuffle as well as take measures to deal with Sadr and his militia.

…I think the goal is to press and encourage Maliki to make some decisions rather than to replace him which might further destabilize the political process instead of advancing it.

Speculations for new names are already appearing in the media here and these names indicate that the direction of the new bloc will be towards including, and giving a bigger role to, elements who believe in continuing the political process and who reject extreme ideas and irrational suggestions for solutions. The latter represented by groups such as the Sadrists, the Ahl al-Iraq conference (the part of the accord front headed by Adnan al-Dulaimi) and Salih al-Mutlaq and his team, in other words the parties that call for fighting the MNF and deal irresponsibly with the sectarian situation whether by violent acts or provocative statements.

In fact both sides or both fronts are forming at the same time as the parties that are being excluded from the governing coalition are uniting themselves too and this is likely to heat up the struggle because the extremists will feel much more sidelined than they already are and they realize that the new, let’s call it moderate, front will become a majority. This was clear when the radical parties tried two weeks ago to collect signatures of MPs to call for ending the presence of the MNF; they were able to collect 105 signatures which leaves a clear majority of 170 votes capable of passing its own new plans.

To me personally I don’t think the new front will be able to eradicate violence but will focus on making some governance reforms which is a needed step to face extremism later; first you contain them politically and call things with their names so that later you can actually contain them.

The toughest part in the work of the new front will be gaining the trust of a hard-to-satisfy-population traumatized by rough times and frustrated by the performance it’s seen so far.

Without winning enough support (from a public mostly standing idle or neutral in this partisan conflict) the front will not be able to easily contain the radical elements which will of course continue to play the role of destructive armed opposition with strong backing from the neighboring outside.

The other thing that bothers me is that the front although will include Sunni, Shia and Kurds it still retains an Islamic direction.

Although Mohammed is no doubt wise to be very skeptical about the short term prospects of a reduction in violence (he instead sees this as laying the groundwork), I think he underestimates the high probability of a U.S.-led assault on the Sadr militias if such a net of support can be placed under Maliki (i.e., one that convinces him he need not rely on the Sadr block in parliament)…

2 Responses to “Checking In With Iraq The Model”

1 KI Says:
December 15th, 2006 at 3:48 pm
Theyr’e blaming Baker becasue the creator of the ISG, US Institute for Peace wants more money and and a building on the mall. They need to fire all the CIA operatons officers they hired that leaked the use of the ISG. Everyone was waiting to do business with Iran and they did the minute the use of ISG was announced. Wait on ISG.
2 Blue Crab Boulevard » Go Back, Sea! Says:
December 15th, 2006 at 11:20 pm
[…] UPDATE: Others: Redstate, Townhall, Decision '08, Wake up America, Don Surber, […]