Decision ‘08

Today’s Must-Read: The Hadley Memo

Leaving aside the question, for the moment, of whether there exists anything the New York Times WON’T print (a letter in praise of Bush, perhaps?), I must admit that the leaked Stephen Hadley memo is quite remarkable, and should be considered required reading.

A few highlights. The bad news first:

We returned from Iraq convinced we need to determine if Prime Minister Maliki is both willing and able to rise above the sectarian agendas being promoted by others. Do we and Prime Minister Maliki share the same vision for Iraq? If so, is he able to curb those who seek Shia hegemony or the reassertion of Sunni power? The answers to these questions are key in determining whether we have the right strategy in Iraq.

Maliki reiterated a vision of Shia, Sunni, and Kurdish partnership, and in my one-on-one meeting with him, he impressed me as a leader who wanted to be strong but was having difficulty figuring out how to do so. Maliki pointed to incidents, such as the use of Iraqi forces in Shia Karbala, to demonstrate his even hand. Perhaps because he is frustrated over his limited ability to command Iraqi forces against terrorists and insurgents, Maliki has been trying to show strength by standing up to the coalition. Hence the public spats with us over benchmarks and the Sadr City roadblocks.

Despite Maliki’s reassuring words, repeated reports from our commanders on the ground contributed to our concerns about Maliki’s government. Reports of nondelivery of services to Sunni areas, intervention by the prime minister’s office to stop military action against Shia targets and to encourage them against Sunni ones, removal of Iraq’s most effective commanders on a sectarian basis and efforts to ensure Shia majorities in all ministries — when combined with the escalation of Jaish al-Mahdi’s (JAM) [the Arabic name for the Mahdi Army] killings — all suggest a campaign to consolidate Shia power in Baghdad.

While there does seem to be an aggressive push to consolidate Shia power and influence, it is less clear whether Maliki is a witting participant. The information he receives is undoubtedly skewed by his small circle of Dawa advisers, coloring his actions and interpretation of reality. His intentions seem good when he talks with Americans, and sensitive reporting suggests he is trying to stand up to the Shia hierarchy and force positive change. But the reality on the streets of Baghdad suggests Maliki is either ignorant of what is going on, misrepresenting his intentions, or that his capabilities are not yet sufficient to turn his good intentions into action.

There follows a list of steps Maliki could take to improve the situation, and steps the U.S. could take to shore up his support that I’m leaving out to hopefully encourage you to read the whole thing.

There then comes a paragraph that thrills my heart, for it is a step we have been discussing here: forming a new parliamentary block (though one that includes Maliki, which I’m not at all convinced is possible):

If it is Maliki’s assessment that he does not have the capability — politically or militarily — to take the steps outlined above, we will need to work with him to augment his capabilities. We could do so in two ways. First, we could help him form a new political base among moderate politicians from Sunni, Shia, Kurdish and other communities. Ideally, this base would constitute a new parliamentary bloc that would free Maliki from his current narrow reliance on Shia actors. (This bloc would not require a new election, but would rather involve a realignment of political actors within the Parliament). In its creation, Maliki would need to be willing to risk alienating some of his Shia political base and may need to get the approval of Ayatollah Sistani for actions that could split the Shia politically. Second, we need to provide Maliki with additional forces of some kind.

The memo concludes with some recommendations for action:

We should waste no time in our efforts to determine Maliki’s intentions and, if necessary, to augment his capabilities. We might take the following steps immediately:

¶Convince Maliki to deliver on key actions that might reassure Sunnis (open banks and direct electricity rebuilding in Sunni areas, depoliticize hospitals);

¶Tell Maliki that we understand that he is working his own strategy for dealing with the Sadrists and that:

• you have asked General Casey to support Maliki in this effort

• it is important that we see some tangible results in this strategy soon;

¶Send your personal representative to Baghdad to discuss this strategy with Maliki and to press other leaders to work with him, especially if he determines that he must build an alternative political base;

¶Ask Casey to develop a plan to empower Maliki, including:

• Formation of National Strike Forces

• Dramatic increase in National Police embedding

• More forces under Maliki command and control

¶Ask Secretary of Defense and General Casey to make a recommendation about whether more forces are need in Baghdad;

¶Ask Secretary of Defense and General Casey to devise a more robust embedding plan and a plan to resource it;

¶Direct your cabinet to begin an intensive press on Saudi Arabia to play a leadership role on Iraq, connecting this role with other areas in which Saudi Arabia wants to see U.S. action;

¶If Maliki seeks to build an alternative political base:

• Press Sunni and other Iraqi leaders (especially Hakim) [Abdul Aziz al-Hakim, the leader of the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq, a Maliki rival] to support Maliki

• Engage Sistani to reassure and seek his support for a new nonsectarian political movement.

Coupled with the Bush trip to Jordan to meet with Maliki, and today’s revelation that the Iraq Study Group report will be released in a mere seven days, we are clearly in a pivotal stretch of the war…

3 Responses to “Today’s Must-Read: The Hadley Memo”

1 Colin Says:
November 29th, 2006 at 3:30 pm
That was a very good report, and I have a feeling the administration was following up on it (see, for example, Cheney’s trip to Saudi Arabia). In light of how effective this report seems, this may be the most damaging leak we’ve seen yet. Once our doubts and suspicions about a leader like Maliki are made public like they’ve been in the Times, the chances of him going along with our plans, agreeing with the “occupiers” who’ve just “insulted” him, are remote. If we see a disaster arise out of the summit in Jordan, this leak is to blame. Maliki may have to stick his thumb in our eye just to save face.

God, I hope I’m wrong.
2 Mark Says:
November 29th, 2006 at 3:33 pm
Yep, Collin, I share your concerns…it would be a huge shame if this careless leak were to neutralize a truly excellent analysis and set of recommendations on such a colossally important issue…
3 Sandy Says:
November 29th, 2006 at 4:12 pm
Colin, I also hope you’re wrong but believe you’re absolutely spot on. This leads me to wonder if this was a careless leak or a carefully coordinated or controlled leak scheduled to make the ISG report look reasonable and acceptable. At least it will not be released one day later (Pearl Harbor Day).