The End of the Bush Doctrine?

Steven Warshawsky of the American Thinker is writing the eulogy for the Bush Doctrine, the bold post-9/11 strategy in the War on Terror that he says has been definitively buried by our approach to Iraq. Warshawsky enumerates the four fundamental principles of the Bush Doctrine:

The first is that the war on terror “begins with Al Qaeda, but it does not end there. It will not end until every terrorist group of global reach has been found, stopped and defeated.”

…The second principle underlying the Bush Doctrine is that our enemy in this war is not just the “radical network of terrorists,” but “every government that supports them.”

…The third principle of the Bush Doctrine is the concept of preemption.

…The fourth principle of the Bush Doctrine is not really a principle, but a vision. A moral vision. President Bush is the first president to denounce the Islamic terrorists for what they truly are: evil.

Well, that’s a bit sloppy perhaps, this distinction between vision and principle (couldn’t number 4 have been rewritten as a principle, i.e., we will not shirk from calling evil what it is?), but that’s a pretty good summation, all in all.

What went wrong, according to Warshawky, is we never mobilized ourselves to match the rhetoric; that is to say, we told Americans to go about life as normal, and didn’t ask for the sacrifices necessary to fulfill the vision:

Whatever the reason, the result is that the United States now lacks the military resources, and homefront commitment, to fight the war Bush originally envisioned. Our military today is one-third smaller than it was during the First Gulf War, and only 40% what it was during the Vietnam War. For a nation of nearly 300 million people, with a gross domestic product of $12 trillion (more than Japan, Germany, Britain, and France combined), the truth of the matter is that our current defense budget ($400 billion or 3.3% of GDP) and troop levels (1.4 million active duty) represent a meager commitment of the nation’s wealth and manpower to fighting international Islamic terrorism, let alone meeting our other military needs. Given the enormous stakes involved in this struggle, President Bush’s failure after 9/11 to mobilize the country for an all-out war against the “radical network of terrorists and every government that supports them” was inexcusable, and undermined the Bush Doctrine from the start.

The result? By not mobilizing when it was politically possible, we have limited ourself to Iraq, and allowed Iran and Syria to continue their evil ways from lack of resources:

I have little doubt that Bush “the cowboy” would prefer to take military action against Iran and Syria, but he is hamstrung by an undersized military that lacks the additional resources needed for a successful attack on these two countries. Unfortunately, the time to mobilize the American people for war has long passed. Any proposals to significantly expand the size of the military, whether through a draft or sharply increased recruitment efforts, would be met with fierce political opposition. Sadly, I think it will take another major terrorist attack on American soil before the American people are prepared once again to rally to the defense of their country, as they were ready to do after 9/11. I hope the next president does not let that opportunity slip away as President Bush did.

Certainly, there is much truth in Warshawky’s essay; indeed, the prevailing sentiment is for retrenchment, not expansion. Is the Bush Doctrine dead, then? Is Warshawsky correct? I don’t think we’ll know definitively until November, 2008…but clearly, Iraq has dealt a crushing blow to our plans to expand the war on terror.

It will be a very different electorate that votes in 2008; one that will be weary of war. We need a candidate that understands the job hasn’t been finished, with the ability to rally the American public to the cause. It won’t be easy, but it’s essential that we continue the fight. More than anything else, the stance on this issue will determine the candidate I support.

8 comments to The End of the Bush Doctrine?

  • It may look like that now. But consider this: Iraqi troops are slowly moving into primary roles (in Fallujah, last year, two-thirds of the troops were ours, we led the fight, and Iraqis just secured the ground we’d already cleared; this month in Tal Afar those numbers and roles were reversed) — and they are already more numerous than the forces we have in Iraq. Well before the 2008 primaries, Iraq will be a valuable ally in the GWOT, rather than a net drain on our assets.

    The Iranian mullahs should be nervous.

  • I agree with Clint (I always agree with Clint)–I really thought this article was wrong-headed. He’s going to look mighty foolish if we’re in Tehran a year or 18 months hence, using those “lilypad” bases that Jalabi promised us not once but twice on Friday. In my opinion, there’s way too much nay-saying going on right now from armchair hawks like Kristol and Warshawky and Brooks.

    For an alternative take on the success of the Bush doctrine, I suggest

    http://www.victorhanson.com/articles/hanson090905.html

  • [...] Mark Steyn looks at the War on Terror and comes to some of the same conclusions, but some rather different ones, as well, from the Warshawsky piece we discussed earlier today. [...]

  • mark, the lesser

    I don’t have to read the article to realize that no alternative is offered.

    It is actually the ‘wait and see’ plan. Or the Clinton Global Policy Avoidance Scheme. A raging success for 10 plus years…

    My favorite quote?
    “I have little doubt that Bush “the cowboy” would prefer to take military action against Iran and Syria, but he is hamstrung by an undersized military that lacks the additional resources needed for a successful attack on these two countries.”

    Firstly, the belief that all our assets are tied up in Iraq is an admission of idiocy. Secondly, that the reason for Bush not taking action against Syria or Iran is centered around our ability to wage the War is the biggest(and only?) factor, is equally stupid. Thirdly, each country is viewed/treated seperately, and the idea that the Bush admin views all as equivalents can only mean that the short yellow bus, was probably running late when this guy was writing.

    I’m guessing the author made no reference to our actually military size, believes a President can go to War without Congressional Approval(technically, he can but for 90 days(?)) and assumes all middle-eastern countries are the same. Did I mention he is probably a democrat?

    IN the media’s refusal to mine an alternative plan from the left, the dems will continually be adrift. Even if Bush’s plan is the worst plan ever(although it is the ONLY option, and I believe correct), the pro-active will always defeat the clueless.

    My BIG yellow bus just pulled up…

  • Hi Mark—Interesting article. Thanks for the link. It’s well written and well argued, in my opinion, but not very well reasoned.

    It seems to me that the author is arguing primarily from the point of those elements within the military that oppose the sweeping changes brought about by SecDef Rumsfeld. Quotes like this one seem to me to indicate that, beneath his provocative critique, the author is simply advocating a larger military and not Mr Rumsfeld’s “lighter more agile” force.

    “[T]he United States now lacks the military resources … to fight the war Bush originally envisioned. Our military today is one-third smaller than it was during the First Gulf War, and only 40% what it was during the Vietnam War.”

    Whether this statistic is exactly correct or not, our military is smaller now because that’s the way Mr. Rumsfeld has envisioned it. And the president obviously sees eye-to-eye with the Secretary of Defense. If you’ve seen the ads, been on a military base or met any new recruits, as I have, it becomes apparent pretty quickly that the Army is now being recreated as something of a “glamour profession,” meant to attract only the best and brightest, not unlike the Ivy League.

    I have a different take on the quote that Mark the Lesser refers to above: “I have little doubt that Bush ‘the cowboy’ would prefer to take military action against Iran and Syria, but he is hamstrung by an undersized military that lacks the additional resources needed for a successful attack on these two countries.”

    Again, the military is not “undersized” and any study of Mr. Rumsfeld’s widely written of concept—or vision—for a 21st military would reveal this to the author.

    Missing from his argument entirely is the political reality of the situation, both domestically and internationally. President Bush has changed both the world and the United States in some dramatic ways. But realistically there is only so much any one person can do, no matter the degree of personal commitment or “political capital” he may or may not have. My feeling is that the remainder of President Bush’s second term will be spent stabilizing Iraq, unless something extreme happens, like another attack on the continental U.S.

    It will be the job of the next president, in my opinion, to take further steps in terms of bringing democratic reform and political stability to more of the Middle East.

  • Greg, I agree with your conclusion; if the next presidential pick is not a strong one, regardless of party (though clearly you know what party I prefer), then we lose our momentum, and the author is largely correct. A strong president, though he (or she!) may differ in tactics, must continue the fight in one form or another.

    Excellent point, though, that part of the reason the military is smaller (most of the reason?) is by design…

  • Steven M. Warshawsky

    Thank you very much for linking to my article, and engaging in this spirited and informative debate.

    I would just like to add a few points: (1) I am a staunch Republican and Bush-voter, who has never been diagnosed with either idiocy or insanity. (2) The gentleman who suggested otherwise, simply because he disagrees with my analysis, sounds like the Democrat to me. (3) While it is true that our military is small by design, that is not necessarily a good thing. More to the point, I have never read any serious military analyst who argued that we have sufficient resources to wage war in Syria and Iran, as we are doing in Iraq. Drop some bombs, yes. Take over the country, no. That requires the proverbial “boots on the grounds,” which we don’t have right now. (4) The Bush Doctrine, as originally formulated, was not about spreading democracy. It was about destroying our enemies — “the radical network of terrorists and every government that supports them” — BEFORE they acquire WMDs and hit us again. So what about Syria and Iran? Under the Bush Doctrine, the whole point is that we wouldn’t *wait* and *hope* for the best.

    I am sure there are many reasons (and I don’t pretend to know or be able to explain all of them) as to why the Bush Doctrine no longer guides America’s approach to the war on terror. And I am sure that there are points in my analysis that can be fairly criticized. But I think my main point — that the Bush Doctrine as originally formulated is dead — is a valid one. Of course, I will be more than happy to be proven wrong. I hope I am. That would be a great day. Thanks again.

  • Well, Mr. Warshawsky, thank you for coming by, we’re honored to have you here. I tend to agree with most of your points, as you probably gathered from my original post and short comment above, but like you, I hope you’re wrong(!), as well, because I think the Bush Doctrine was an important statement of principle, and a smart (and necessary) strategic move. My fear is that, by overselling the WMD argument, and thus losing much credibility with the public, followed by our well-known post-war occupation woes, our hands are now tied somewhat, and, as you say, only (God forbid) another big attack will again loosen them. In any event, excellent article, and good food for thought…

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